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The economics of the telethon:  









We run a series of experiments in which subjects have to choose their level of contribution to a pure 
public good. The design differs from the standard public good game with respect to the decision procedure. 
Instead of deciding simultaneously in each round, subjects are randomly ordered in a sequence which differs 
from round to round. We compare sessions in which subjects can observe the exact contributions from earlier 
decisions ("sequential treatment with information") to sessions in which subjects decide sequentially but cannot 
observe earlier contributions ("sequential treatment without information"). The results indicate that sequentiality 
increases the level of contribution to the public good when subjects are informed about the contribution levels of 
lower ranked subjects while sequentiality alone has no effect on contributions. Moreover, we observe that earlier 
players try to influence positively the contributions of subsequent decision makers in the sequence, by making a 
large contribution. Such behaviour is motivated by the belief that subsequent players will reciprocate by also 
making a large contribution. We also discuss the effect of group size on aggregate contributions. Finally, we 
conceptualize a model where agents’ preferences incorporate a “weak” moral motivation element. The moral 
motivation is “weak” in the sense that contributors update their morally ideal level of contribution according to 
observed behaviours. This suggested qualification of rational contributors fits well with the patterns observed in 
the lab. 3 
1. Introduction 
 
Each  year  many  telethons  are  organized  across  the  world.  Such  fundraising  events,  broadcast  on 
television, usually last for many hours with the purpose to collect money for popular worthy causes, 
such  as  charities,  hospitals,  children  in  need,  victims  of  wars  or  catastrophic  natural  events...  In 
essence, people sequentially contribute to a public good, with a tote board that continuously displays 
the amount of donations. Sequential contributions are actually used for a large variety of public goods: 
individual  efforts  in  housework,  ratification  of  international  treaties  about  environmental  issues, 
scientific research, etc… In these examples contributions are not necessarily in monetary terms but they 
share two important features: the amount of public good provided depends on the aggregate level of 
contributions, and later contributor in the sequence can observe, to some extent, previous contributions.   
 
Surprisingly,  the  economic  literature  on  sequential  contributions  is  rather  scarce,  while  an 
overwhelming  bulk  of  knowledge  has  been  been  accumulated  on  simultaneous  contributions 
environments.  Other  things  being  equal,  should  one  expect  a  higher  level  of  public  good  when 
contributions  are  sequential?  Getting  back  to  the  telethon  example,  does  the  publicly  released 
information about contributions affect donations during the campaign ?  
 
Varian  (1994)  showed  that  a  sequential  contribution  environment  theoretically  exacerbates  the 
incentives to free-ride,  compared to a simultaneous contribution environment.  Instead of playing a 
Nash  equilibrium  as  in  the  simultaneous  contribution  environment,  in  the  sequential  contribution 
environment agents play the Stackelberg equilibrium. In a two-player game with utility functions that 
are  concave  in  the  public  good  and  linear  in  the  private  good,  Varian  (1994)  shows  that  in  the 
simultaneous  contributions  environment,  the  player  who  likes  the  public  good  most  contributes 4 
everything while the other player free rides. In contrast, in the sequential contributions environment, 
the first contributor has an incentive to free ride even if he likes the public good more than the other 
agent. Overall, the level of public good is therefore reduced compared to the level under simultaneous 
contributions. In sharp contrast with those predictions, the few experiments that studied sequential 
contributions show a positive effect of sequentiality in various contexts (Moxnes and van der Heijden, 
2000 ;List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Shang and Croson, 2003; Güth et al., 2004). This raises a central 
question about the explanations for the increased level of contribution engendered by the presence of 
sequentiality. Indeed the logic of behaviors leading to a level of public good larger than the one under 
simultaneous contributions, has no place in the usual scenario where contributors maximize their self-
centered utility. 
 
The  experimental  literature  suggests  at  least  three  reasons  for  larger  contributions  under 
sequentiality : reciprocity, leadership and pure ordering. First, according to the reciprocity motive an 
agent reacts to the observed contributions of lower ranked agents, even if he believes that he has no 
power on subsequent contributors (for a recent and comprehensive introduction to the economics of 
reciprocity,  see  Kolm,  2006).  A  growing  experimental  literature  shows  the  importance  of  the 
reciprocity motive on contribution decisions. Such motive depends on the information available to the 
contributor, and is likely to be stronger as more information becomes available. Indeed information 
about individual contributions is well known in the literature to significantly influence the level of 
contribution  (Sell  and  Wilson,  1991;  Weimann,  1994;  Croson,  2001;  Duffy  and  Feltovich,  2002; 
Andreoni and Petries, 2004). Second, according to  leadership, early contributors have a responsibility 
in setting the good example for other agents by making a large contribution, because they expect later 
contributors  will  positively  react,  for  instance  in  accordance  with  the  reciprocity  motive.  If 
sequentiality is endogenous, it is likely that the most generous contributors have a preference for acting 5 
early in the sequence. The idea of leadership is that early contributors believe they have the power to 
influence positively later contributors, and that this power is stronger when the sequence is longer. 
Finally, even an agent who is unable to observe previous contributions and who believes that he cannot 
influence  subsequent  contributions,  might  be  influenced  by  the  knowledge  of  his  ranking  in  the 
sequence. The so-called “pure-ordering” effect has been illustrated in common pool resource (CPR) 
experiments. A plausible explanation is that individuals have a moral motivation to contribute that is 
influenced by their position in the game. For example, in CPR experiments, first movers take a larger 
share than final movers, a fact that is commonly accepted and expected, as if subjects adhered to a 
social norm of taking. 
 
In this paper we isolate experimentally the three effects of sequentiality in a pure public good game 
where subjects have to choose their level of contribution. We designed an experiment where subjects 
contribute sequentially under various information conditions. Our aim is threefold: first, we want to 
identify, experimentally, the variables that affect contributions in such a context, in particular how does 
a  subject’s  rank  in  the  sequence  affect  his  contribution;  second,  we  want  to  clearly  separate  the 
leadership effect from the ordering effect that was found in the experimental literature on sequential 
common pool resources games (Rapoport et al., 1993, Budescu et al., 1995, Suleiman et al., 1996, 
Rapoport,  1997).  More  generally,  ordering  effects  may  arise  in  contexts  where  subjects  move 
sequentially, without being able to observe previous moves of other players. A substantial experimental 
literature addressed the issue, by trying to identify the conditions under which, a pure ordering effect 
might arise (Cooper et al., 1993, Weber and Camerer, 2004, Güth et al., 1998). Finally, because our 
data  discard  the  pure  ordering  effect,  we  want  to  provide  a  plausible  theoretical  explanation  that 
somehow combines the two other effects of leadership and reciprocity. To do so, we develop a model 
of sequential contributions to a public good with rational players who have a “weak moral motivation”. 6 
The  assumption  of  weak  moral  motivation  means  that  each  player  has  an  intrinsic  motivation  to 
contribute, but his motivation is externally influenced by his observations of others’ contributions. A 
player’s effective contribution is therefore the outcome of a revision process of his moral motivation to 
contribute.   
 
In  our  experiment  subjects  contribute  sequentially  to  a  pure  public  good,  with  two  information 
conditions : a treatment without information and a treatment with information. In the treatment without 
information, individuals decide sequentially but cannot observe earlier contributions. In the treatment 
with information, subjects observe the contributions of subjects who decided earlier in the sequence. 
The reference treatment is a simultaneous public good game (no sequential move and no information). 
Besides,  we  also  investigate  for  the  sequential  treatment,  whether  the  population  size  affects  the 
average contribution. Increasing the size of the group of contributors may have conflicting effects : a 
positive effect because leaders can influence more players, and a negative effect because the temptation 
to  free  ride  increases  as  the  size  of  the  provision  increases.  In  the  experiment  we  consider  two 
population sizes : groups of 4  players and groups of 8 players.  
 
Our  main  findings  are  as  follows:  i)  in  the  sequential  treatment  with  information,  observed 
contributions  decline  with  the  order  of  play,  and  the  average  contribution  is  larger  than  in  the 
simultaneous treatment; ii) sequentiality alone has no effect on contributions; iii) the size of the group 
has no significant impact on the average level of contributions, iv) we show that these results are 
compatible with the predictions of a model of sequential contributions incorporating a moral motivation 
function. Ex ante, each individual holds a morally ideal contribution, which he updates according to the 
observed contributions of earlier players. The model predicts that in a society of identical players who 
contribute sequentially in a linear public goods game, successive contributions decline. Furthermore, 7 
the more sensitive players are to observed contributions, the larger the average contribution of the 
society’s members. 
 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature on the possible 
effects of sequentiality and highlights our differences. Section 3 presents the experimental design and 
section 4 provides the corresponding results. In section 5 we propose a model of moral motivation 
whose implications are consistent with our experimental data. Finally, we conclude in section 6 by 
drawing the implications of our analysis. 
 
2.  Related literature 
 
While  most  experimental  research  on  voluntary  contributions  to  a  public  good,  has  focused  on 
simultaneous contribution environments, there are a few recent experiments that studied a sequential 
contribution environment. As mentioned above, the results of these experiments are in sharp contrast 
with Varian’s prediction. 
 
2.1. Sequentiality with observation of previous moves 
 
According to the experimental findings in sequential contribution environments, the first contributor 
tries to set the “good example” by making a large contribution in order to lead followers towards high 
contributions. In Güth et al. (2004), the leader’s contribution is announced publicly before the followers 
decide  simultaneously  about  their  contribution.  They  found  that  such  announcement  significantly 
increases  the  average  level  of  contributions  to  the  public  good,  although  followers  contribute 
significantly less than the leader. Their interpretation is that followers condition their contribution on 8 
the leader’s contribution like in a repeated simultaneous contributions game, where subjects reciprocate 
previous period average contribution ( Keser & Van Winden ( 2000)). Moxnes and van der Heijden 
(2000) run a similar experiment, but with a public bad : in each period one subject is called upon to act 
as  a  leader,  i.e.  his  contribution  is  made  public  before  the  other  members  of  the  group  decide 
simultaneously. Their results show that subjects invest 15% less in the public bad when there is a leader 
who  sets  the  “good  example”  compared  to  the  simultaneous  move  game.  In  the  two-player  game 
studied by Potters et al. (2004), one of the two players knows the “quality” of the public good, and 
players can decide to contribute either in a simultaneous move game or in a sequential move game, 
where the second mover can observe the contribution of the first mover. The authors found that the 
sequential move game is chosen more frequently with significantly larger contributions. 
 
Several empirical studies also showed the importance of the leadership-effect in various contexts (List 
and  Lucking-Reiley,  2002,  Shang  and  Croson,  2003).  Experimental  and  empirical  studies  suggest 
therefore  that  contributions  are  positively  influenced  by  the  informational  context  induced  by 
sequentiality, even if the standard prediction is that there should be no effect, or worse, that the free-
rider problem is exacerbated (Varian, 1994).  
 
The positive leadership effect found in the experimental literature raises a central question about 
subjects’ motivation to act as a leader : why do subjects in the position of the first contributor choose to 
make a larger contribution than they would make otherwise ? For example, Güth et al. (2004) showed 
that followers contribute less than the leader when they contribute simultaneously. This raises a further 
question about the leadership effect in a context where followers contribute also sequentially. Does the 
leadership vanish with the rank in the sequence of contributions? 
 9 
2.2. Sequentiality without observation and ordering effect 
 
According to standard game theory, a change in the timing of moves when no information is revealed 
to  the  players,  should  not  affect  their  choice  of  actions.  In  other  words,  if  agents’  actions  are 
unobservable, a game in which moves are sequential is strategically equivalent to a game in which 
moves are simultaneous.  
 
However, in a series of papers, Rapoport and his colleagues (Rapoport et al., 1993, Budescu et al., 
1995, Suleiman et al., 1996, Rapoport, 1997) exhibit a pure positional effect in common pool resource 
dilemma games. They showed that even in a situation without any information asymmetry (request 
disclosure), the first mover has a tendency to take a larger part, while later movers in the sequence, 
have a tendency to take less. In this game overexploitation of the common pool leads to null profits for 
all players. It is therefore likely that subjects rely on the tacit cue, commonly accepted, that the first 
served  should  take  a  larger  amount  than  the  followers.  Typically,  such  cues  can  be  used  as  a 
coordination device to facilitate equilibrium selection.  
 
The implication of this result is that in a sequential contribution context, where previous contributions 
are observable, observed patterns can be attributed either to a pure ordering effect or to an information 
effect. For example, Güth et al. (2004) found that later contributions decrease when the first player’s 
contribution in the sequence is announced. This negative effect might be simply caused by the ordering 
of  moves  as  suggested  by  the  experiment  of  Abele  &  Ehrhardt  (2005).  They  found  that  average 
contributions are larger in a two-player simultaneous move game than in the sequential move game 
where  contributions  are  not  observable.  Since  contributions  are  not  observable,  neither  under 
simultaneous moves, nor under sequential moves, the standard game-theoretic prediction is the same. 10 
However,  the  authors  found  that subjects  are  more  likely  to  cooperate in  the  simultaneous  moves 
games,  a  fact  that  they  attribute  to  a  stronger  “feeling  of  groupness”  when  contributions  are 
simultaneous rather than sequential.  
 
Cooper et al. (1993) also found a first mover advantage in the battle of sexes games. When the game is 
played sequentially without observability, the equilibrium which is more favourable to the first mover 
is played more frequently
1. Overall, this literature suggests that when players can choose sequentially, 
but  without  disclosure,  coordination  is  facilitated  because  equilibria  where  the  first  mover  has  an 
advantage become more salient.   
 
To investigate further this idea, Weber and Camerer, (2004) manipulated the timing of moves in a 
weakest link coordination game. The aim of this experiment was to distinguish between the explanation 
based on “saliency of first mover advantage” and an alternative explanation based on the concept of 
“virtual  observability”  introduced  by  Amershi  et  al.  (1989).  According  to  the  virtual  observability 
theory in a sequential game without observability, players apply subgame perfection as if all moves 
were observable, provided that the selected equilibrium is also an equilibrium for the original game. 
The virtual observability prediction fits better their data on the sequential weakest-link coordination 
game,  than  the  pure  ordering  prediction.  Besides  the  leadership  effect,  this  literature  shows  that  
sequentiality as such can generate other effects, either by affecting the saliency of some equilibria, or 
by affecting the players’ reasoning, or simply the perception of the game.  
 
                                                 
1 In the two-players battle of sexes game, identifying one of the players as the “first player” and the other as the “second 
player” resulted in a significant increase of the frequency of the preferred equilibrium outcome by the first player (see 
Cooper et al., 1993). In this example, the timing effect can be attributed to a first mover advantage, or more generally to a 
positional advantage (Budescu et al., 1995). The same type of explanation applies to the case of a step-level public goods 11 
However, all experiments which have studied order of play, with the exception of Güth et al. (1998), 
involved a coordination problem : common pool resource games, step-level public goods games, battle-
of-sexes, … On the other hand, in Güth et al. (1998), where the first player has to play a dominated 
strategy in order to obtain a first mover advantage, the pure-ordering effect vanishes.  
 
In the light of the literature about the timing of moves, it is therefore important to separate carefully the 
leadership  and  reciprocity  effects  induced  by  the  observation  of  early  contributions  from  the  pure 
timing  effect  induced  by  sequentiality  of  contributions.  In  order  to  disentangle  these  effects,  our 
experiment is based on a voluntary contribution game with a unique dominant strategy equilibrium in 
order to avoid any coordination problem for the players. According to Güth et al.’s (1988) results, 
subjects should not deviate from equilibrium play in this case, and therefore no pure ordering effect 
should  be  present.  Furthermore,  since  there  is  a  unique  dominant  strategy  equilibrium,  virtual 
observability does not make a different prediction.  
 
3. Experimental design and standard theoretical predictions 
 
The  experiment  consisted  of  16  sessions  of  15  periods  each.  Experimental  sessions  were 
conducted  both  at  the  University  of  Rennes
2  and  at  the  university  of  Montpellier
3  in  France.  252 
subjects were recruited from undergraduate classes in business and economics at both sites. None of the 
subjects had previously participated in a public good experiment and none of them participated in more 
                                                                                                                                                                        
game or resource dilemma game. In each of these games, there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, a situation which 
leads to a coordination problem. 
2 CREM (Centre de recherche en Economie et Management) , 
3 LAMETA (Laboratoire de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée) 12 
than one session. The experiment was computerized using the Ztree program. On average, a session 
lasted about an hour and 20 minutes
4 including initial instructions and payment of subjects.  
 
We  set  up  an  experimental  design  that  allows  us  to  investigate  the  effect  of  information 
accumulation  on  individual  contributions  in  a  sequential  contribution  environment.  The  reference 
treatment  is  a  simultaneous  voluntary  contribution  game.  At  the  beginning  of  each  period,  each 
member of a group of n subjects is endowed with 10 tokens that he can invest in a private account and 
in a group account. Let xi be the contribution of player i to the group account and x-i the aggregate 
contribution of all other players - except i – to the group account. The function u(xi, x-i) is player i’s 
payoff if he contributes xi and the other players contribute x-i. We assume that each account has a 
constant marginal return, which we set equal to 1 for the private account and 0.5 for the group account 
(equation (1)). Note that with our assumptions the marginal per capita return is also equal to 0.5. The 
unique dominant strategy equilibrium of the one-shot game is for each player to contribute xi = 0. The 
constituent game was repeated exactly 15 periods. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium for the 
repeated game is for each player to contribute xi = 0 each period. On the other hand, the group optimum 
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n
h
h i i i x x x x u
1
5 . 0 10 ) , (                                                   (1) 
In the reference treatment all subjects simultaneously select the amount of their endowment that 
they  want  to  contribute  to  the  group  account.  Subjects  were  instructed  to  indicate  only  their 
contribution to the group account, the remainder of their endowment being automatically invested in 
                                                 
4 The sequential treatments took slightly more time in large groups.  13 
their private account. Tokens invested in the group account generate the same payoff for each member 
of the group.  
 
Since we shall focus on the effects of differential information on individual contributions, we 
identify our treatments by the information available for the subjects. In the benchmark treatment, called 
"simultaneous treatment" subjects take their decisions simultaneously, and therefore none of the players 
has an informational advantage. In a second treatment called sequential treatment without information, 
decisions are taken sequentially. This is done by assigning in the beginning of each round each subject 
to a rank in the decision sequence. In this treatment, subjects know to which rank they are assigned but 
none  of  the  subjects  has  an  informational  advantage.  Indeed  subjects  are  not  informed  about  the 
individual contributions of each lower ranked subject. Since individuals cannot observe contributions in 
the sequential treatment without information, the standard game-theoretic prediction is the same as 
under the benchmark treatment. Finally, the third treatment is identical to the previous treatment except 
that each subject is informed about the individual contribution of each lower ranked subject. The least 
informed subject is the subject who is ranked first in the sequence whereas the most informed subject is 
the one who is ranked last in the sequence. The theoretical prediction remains unchanged compared to 
the  benchmark  treatment.  Indeed,  in  this  game,  the  agents  play  the  Stackelberg  equilibrium, 
contributing nothing to the public good. 
 
The difference in contributions between the benchmark and the sequential treatment without 
information is a measure of the pure ordering effect on contributions. We hypothesize, based on the 
results  of  Güth  et  al.  (1998)  that  simply  knowing  that  one  player  moves  first  should  not  affect 
contributions.  The  difference  in  contributions  between  the  sequential  treatments  with  and  without 
information  is    the  joint  outcome  of  leadership  and  reciprocity  resulting  from  the  information 14 
asymmetry between players. We hypothesize that these two effects together affect positively the level 
of contributions. Indeed, we hypothesis that earlier players in the sequence should contribute more to 
influence later contributors (leadership effect) and that subsequent players should reciprocate previous 
observed contributions (reciprocity  effect).  Finally, the difference between the sequential treatment 
with  information  and  the  benchmark  treatment  measures  both  the  effect  of  sequentiality  and  of 
information asymmetry. Note that our experimental design does not allow to separate reciprocity from 
leadership. A fundamental reason is that leadership is based on expected reciprocity. However, to some 
extent, it is possible to isolate ex post these two motives through a detailed analysis of the  difference 
between intermediary positions and extreme positions. Indeed, the first player’s contribution should not 
be influenced by "reciprocity" since no information about others’ contributions is available to him. 
However, the first player could be influenced by leadership. At the other extreme, the last player in the 
sequence cannot be motivated by "leadership" since he can hardly influence anyone. However, his 
contribution might be motivated by reciprocity. Only players that have an intermediary position can be 
influenced both by "reciprocity" and "leadership".  
 
While the information condition is our main treatment variable, we also study the impact of 
group  size  on  the  level  of  contribution  in  the  sequential  contribution  environment.  We  compare 
treatments with 4 subjects, called small groups hereafter, to treatments with 8 subjects (called large 
groups). Increasing group size lengthens the sequence and therefore might have a positive or negative 
influence  on  individual  contributions.  Adding  more  players  to  the  sequence  might  strengthen  the 
leadership effect, since early players can influence more subsequent players. In particular the fourth 
player still has an influence in large groups in contrast to small groups. On the other hand, as the size of 
the group increases, the temptation to free ride for higher ranked subjects becomes stronger because the 
cumulated contribution can become larger. This would imply a negative effect of group size on the 15 
average contribution. It is not obvious therefore what the effect of increasing the size of the group will 
be on aggregate.  
 
We relied on the same presentation for all treatments
5. At the end of each period, the computer 
screen displayed the subject’s investment decision, the total group contribution and the earnings of the 
group account as well as the total earnings. Cumulated earnings since the beginning of the game, as 
well as the number of the period were also on display. After each period, subjects could see their 
detailed  records  since  the  beginning  of  the  experiment.  Table  1  provides  a  summary  of  our 
experimental design. The first four columns indicate the session number, the corresponding treatment, 
the number of groups and the number of subjects that took part in the session. The last column indicates 
the group size (4 or 8 members per group). A partner matching protocol was in effect for all sessions. 
 





                                                 
5To control  for the existence of a possible "framing effect", we ran two sessions with a variant of the reference treatment, 
labeled " simultaneous treatment with framing". This control was required because the sequential version of the contribution 
game required a slight alteration of the usual presentation of the instructions. For this variant the investment in the group 
account is presented as an explicit addition of individual contributions which matches the presentation that was used for the 
sequential contribution treatments.  The instructions pointed out that each subject's contribution would be identified by an 
index, e.g. subject i's contribution is noted Ii, and that the payoff of the group account would be given by 0.5´(I1+I2+...+IN).  
This point was described to the subjects in the following language :  
"I1 is member 1's investment  to the collective account  
I2 is member 2's investment  to the collective account  
I3 is member 3's investment  to the collective account  
This  presentation,  by  making  explicit  the  summation  of  individual  contributions,  could  have  influenced  the  subjects 
decisions in a non predictable way. However, the results indicate no significant difference at any level of significance in 




This section is organized as follows. Subsection 4.1 reports patterns in average contributions in 
the benchmark and the sequential treatments with and without information. We analyze the treatments 
in relation to each other and to the benchmark treatment, and evaluate the hypotheses stated in section 
two. In subsections 4.2 we study the determinants of the contribution behaviour separately for each 
treatment.  
 
4.1. Average individual contribution  
 
Figure 1 and figure 2 illustrate the time path of individual contributions by period respectively 
for  small  and  large  groups.  The  period  number  is  shown  on  the  horizontal  axis  and  the  average 
individual contribution on the vertical axis, where the maximum possible individual contribution is 10. 
These figures show the same pattern for all treatments : there is initially a positive level of contribution 
to the group account and the level of contribution declines with repetition (except for the sequential 
treatment with information in large groups, in which the average contribution level does not change 
appreciably as the game is repeated). This result is in line with several other experiments that have 
documented that the contributions tend to decline with repetition (Isaac et al. 1984, Isaac and Walker, 
1988, Andreoni, 1988, Weimann, 1994, Keser, 1996).  
 
[Figures 1, 2 and table 2 about here] 
 
Result 1 summarizes our findings both about the informational effect and the order effect. 
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Result 1 : Levels of contribution are higher under the sequential treatment with information 
than under the sequential treatment without information. Sequentiality without observability has no 
significant impact on the level of average contribution.  
 
Support for result 1 : Table 2 shows the average contribution for each treatment. The first 
three columns of table 2 indicate the average individual contribution for each small group. The last 
three columns contain the same data for each large group. Comparison of treatments suggests that 
sequentiality with  information  positively  and  significantly  affects  average  contribution.  Our  results 
indicate that, for both small and large groups, average contribution levels in the sequential treatment 
with information are higher than contribution levels in the sequential treatment without information. A 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank-sum test
6 for small groups shows that the difference in average 
contributions between the sequential treatments with and without information is significant at the p < 
.10 level, (z = -1.678, two-tailed). A similar test of the difference between the sequential treatments 
with  and  without  information  for  large  groups  also  indicates  a  positive  and  significant  effect  of 
information (z = 2.082; two tailed test).  
 
In order to isolate the pure effect of sequentiality, we compare the average level of contribution 
in the simultaneous treatment and in the sequential treatment without information. Our results indicate 
that for both small and large groups changing the timing of moves without changing the information 
condition has no significant effect on contributions (respectively z = - 0.145 for small groups and z = 
1.601  for  large  groups).  The  comparison  between  the  simultaneous  treatment  and  the  sequential 
treatment with information indicate that introducing both sequentiality and observability of previous 
contributions in the sequence increases the average contribution level in small groups (z = - 1.843). A 18 
similar test for large groups indicates however, no significant difference between the two treatments (z 
= - 1.44; two tailed test). The insignificant difference between the baseline treatment and the sequential 
treatment with information for the case of large groups suggests that the positive effect of information 
is  partly  offset  by  the  negative  effect  induced  by  sequentiality  alone,  though  this  effect  is  not 
significant.  Finally,  Mann-Whitney  tests  of  the difference of  contributions  between  each treatment 
according  to  group  size  indicate  no  significant  effect  for  the  size.  A  Mann-Whitney  test  of  the 
differences between the simultaneous treatment with size 4 and the simultaneous treatment with size 8 
yields an insignificant z = 0.307.  Similar results are obtained for the sequential treatment without 
information (z = - 1.486 ; two-tailed) and for the sequential treatment with information (z = - 0.480; 
two tailed).  
 
Table  3  provides  formal  evidence  about  the  influence  of  sequentiality  and  information  on 
contribution.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  amount  of  tokens  contributed  in  the  t
th  period.  The 
independent variables are subjects' lagged contribution, the lagged average contribution of the other 
members of the group and several dummy variables including the variable "information", to control for 
the  influence  of  information  on  contribution  and  the  binary  variable  “sequentiality”.  The  variable 
"information" takes value 1 if subjects are informed about previous contributions in the sequence and 0 
otherwise. Finally, the variable "Sequentiality×information" takes value 1 if the treatment introduces 
both sequentiality and information and 0 otherwise. In addition we also introduced a counter variable 
beginning with value 1 in the 15
th period and value 0 in the preceding periods.  
 
[Tables 3 about here] 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
6 In all statistical tests reported in this paper, the unit of observation is the group. 19 
  The estimates summarized in table 3 confirm our previous findings. The specifications of the 
second and third columns reveal that individuals increase their contribution when they are informed 
about the contributions of each lower ranked subject. Table 3 also indicates that for both small and 
large  groups,  the  coefficient  associated  with  "sequentiality"  is  not  significant,  confirming  that 
sequentiality without observability has no significant impact on the level of average contribution.  
 
4.2. Determinants of contribution 
 
We  turn  now  to  another  central  question  of  our  experiment  :  how  do  sequentiality  and 
information about other's contributions affect contributions ? Our answer to that question is stated in 
Result  2  and  Result  3.  Result  2  summarizes  our  findings  about  the  relationship  between  the 
information, either sent or received, and the level of individual contributions. Our conjecture is that 
subjects are influenced both by the information received from the lower ranked subjects and by the 
information  they  “send”  to  higher  ranked  subjects  through  their  own  contribution.  In  result  3  we 
investigate  in  detail  the  dynamic  of  both  the  leadership  and  reciprocity  effects  over  time  in  the 
sequence.  
 
Result  2:  Consistent  with  a  "reciprocity"  effect,  an  individual's  contribution  in  period  t  is 
higher (a) the higher the contributions of the other group members  in period t-1 (in the simultaneous 
and the sequential treatment without observability), (b) the higher the contributions of the lower ranked 
players in the sequence in period t (in the sequential treatment with observability). Consistent with a 
"leadership" effect, individuals who decide first in the sequence, contribute significantly more than 
other group members in the sequential treatment with observability. 
 20 
Support  for  result  2  :  Table  4  contains  the  estimates  of  regression  model  (2)  for  the 
simultaneous treatment: 




i i i x x x b b b
- -
- = + +                                               (2) 
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For the sequential treatment with information we estimate equation (4): 
1 1 inf st
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The  independent  variables  are  subject  i’s  lagged  contribution  ( )
1 - t
i x ,  the  lagged  average 




i x  and the average contribution of lower ranked 




- .  The  latter  two  variables  measure  the  influence  of  received 
information about previous players’ contributions (reciprocity effect).  In the simultaneous treatment 
and the sequential treatment without information, only information about past periods is available. In 
contrast,  in  the  sequential  treatment  with  information,  subjects  may  be  influenced  both  by  the 
information received from previous periods and information from previous decisions in the sequence 
for the current period. Finally, we introduced a dummy variable for the fist position in the group. This 
variable indicates whether the first player in the sequence contributes more than other group members 
("leadership"  effect).    It  takes  value  1  if  subjects  are  in  the  first  position  in  the  sequence  and  0 
otherwise. 
 [Tables 4 about here] 
 
 21 
  If subjects choose their contribution on the basis of their contribution of the previous period, the 
coefficient associated with subject's lagged contribution will be positive and significant. But subjects 
may  also  choose  their  contribution  by  considering  the  lagged  average  contribution  of  other  group 
members. In this case one should observe a positive and significant coefficient for this variable. Table 4 
shows that in all treatments, subjects' own lagged contribution has a positive influence. This coefficient 
is significant at the 1% significance level for all treatments. It is not surprising that in all treatments, a 
subject's past contribution predicts his or her current contribution level. Thus, contributions exhibit 
some inertia in that individuals who make high contributions in one period are more likely to do so in 
the next period. In addition, table 4 indicates that “others lagged average contribution " has a positive 
and  significant  influence  in  the  simultaneous  treatment  and  the  sequential  treatment  without 
information. High contributions on the part of the other group members are imitated or reciprocated by 
high individual contributions in these two treatments. Note that the corresponding coefficient is not 
significant  for  the  treatment  with  information,  while  the  coefficient  associated  to  the  variable 
"contribution of lowest ranked players" is positive and highly significant for that treatment. This result 
suggests that in the sequential treatment with information subjects tend to disregard information from 
the previous period to take into account the more relevant information from the current period. The 
coefficient associated with the variable "contribution of lowest ranked players is also significant for the 
data  concerning  the  final  position  in  the  sequence  (see  estimates  7  and  8).  This  result  shows  the 
existence  of  a reciprocity  effect,  irrespective  of  any  other  effects  such  as  leadership  effect.  Taken 
together,  the  above  results  support  the  idea  that  individuals  reciprocate  previous  observed 
contributions,  with  one  obvious  exception  for  the  first  ranked  player  who  cannot  rely  on  any 
information generated within the sequence and only relies on the previous period average contribution 
observed in the group (significant at 1%)
7.  
                                                 
7 The results are available on request. 22 
Turning to check whether our results also reflects a leadership effect, we find that the coefficient 
associated to the variable "first position" is positive and highly significant in the sequential treatment 
with information, indicating that subjects contribute more in first position (significant at 1%). The 
coefficient associated to this variable is not significant in the sequential treatments without information, 
indicating no pure timing effect. This result suggests that the pure ordering effect does not emerge in 
games that admit a unique equilibrium. Indeed, the ordering effect was essentially observed so far in 
games  with  multiple  equilibria  (e.g.  step-level  public  goods  games)  raising thereby  a  coordination 
problem among subjects. We confirm thereby the conclusion of Güth et al. (1998) who found that if the 
ordering effect requires subjects to deviate from the unique equilibrium, it is less likely to emerge. 
Finally table 4 also reveals an end game effect in most of the treatments. 
 
  Result 3 indicates the dynamic in the sequence of both the leadership and reciprocity effects 
over time.  
 
Result 3 : Contributions remain unaffected by the position in the sequential treatment without 
information. In contrast, in the sequential treatment with information, the level of contribution declines 
with the position in the group. This result indicates that the leadership effect vanishes with the rank 
within a sequence because there are fewer agents who are likely to be influenced as the sequence 
moves towards the last player. On the contrary, the reciprocity effect is not influenced by the position 
in the group since subjects reciprocate previous contributions within the sequence, irrespective of their 




Support for result 3: 
 [Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
 
Figure 3 shows the average contribution of small groups, by rank in the game, for the two 
sequential treatments. Figure 4 provides similar information for large groups. Both figures indicate that 
the average contribution in the sequential treatment with information decreases with the position in the 
game. In contrast, the average level of contribution in the sequential treatments without information 
remains stable with the position. Figures 3 and 4 also reveal that the average contribution of the early 
players in the sequence is higher than in the baseline whereas the opposite is true for higher ranked 
subjects in the sequence. Indeed, Figure 3 reveals that for small groups, the average contribution of the 
three  first  players in  the  sequence  for the  sequential  treatment  with  information  is  larger than  the 
average contribution in the simultaneous treatment. In contrast, the average contribution of the fourth 
player is lower than in the benchmark treatment, indicating a possible "end-sequence effect". Figure 4 
indicates a similar pattern for large groups : the average contribution of the first six players in the 
sequence is larger than the average contribution in the simultaneous treatment whereas the average 
contribution of the last two players is lower than in the benchmark treatment.  
 
[Tables 5  and 6 about here] 
 
Further evidence about this leadership effect can be found in tables 5 and 6 which display the 
average contribution levels by position respectively for small and large groups. In both tables, the 
second  and  the  fifth  columns  indicate  the  overall  average  individual  contribution  for  each  group, 
respectively for the sequential treatments with and without information. The third and sixth columns 
give the  average individual contribution for the first position in the group.  Finally, the fourth and 24 
seventh  columns  provide  similar  information  for  the  final  position  of  the  group.  Our  data  clearly 
indicate that contributions in the sequential treatment with information are higher in the first position 
than in the last position. On the contrary, we do not observe differences between the first and the final 
position for the sequential treatment without information.  
 
Why do contributions decrease over time within the sequence as shown in Figures 3- 4 and 
Tables 5-6?  A potential explanation is that the leadership effect vanishes as fewer agents are likely to 
be  influenced. However,  one  might also  argue  that reciprocity  vanishes as  the sequence proceeds, 
because the temptation to free ride becomes stronger. In order to identify these reasons, we estimated a 
model of the determinants of the contribution levels (Table 7), which both yields a measure of the 
reciprocity effect and of the leadership effect within the sequence. 
 [Table 7 : about here] 
The dependent variable  i x is the individual contribution of player i. The independent variables are 
subject i’s lagged contribution and the variable “contribution of lower ranked individuals”. We added 
dummy variables for each position in the group. The variable "position 3" is 1 if the player is in third 
position  in  the  sequence  of  the  game  and  0  otherwise.  The  construction  of  the  other  variables  is 
identical. The results are interpreted in relation with the omitted category, i.e. the two first positions in 
the  game.  We  also  introduced  several  interaction  variables  to  investigate  whether  the  effect  of 
observing previous contributions differs according to the position in the group. Table 7 indicates that 
both for small and large groups, the position in the game does not influence the average contribution in 
the sequential treatment without information (see estimates 1 and 5). In contrast, estimates (2) and (6) 
show that the level of contribution declines with the position in the sequence in the sequential treatment 
with  information,  for  both  group  sizes.  Notice  the  values  of  the  coefficients  are  weaker  for  early 
positions than for later positions, indicating that the tendency to free ride increases with the position in 25 
the sequence. Table 7 clearly indicates that the level of contribution is higher for earlier players in the 
sequence  and  is  decreasing  with  the  position  in  the  sequence  in  the  sequential  treatment  with 
information.  
 
We are tempted to interpret the  higher  contributions of early players  as a strong leadership effect 
indicating that they correctly anticipate to have a positive influence on subsequent contributors and that 
such influence is declining with the position in the sequence. However this result might also be due to 
the  fact  that  individuals  are  less  and  less  influenced  by  previous  contributions  of  lower  ranked 
individuals in the sequence. In order to isolate these two effects we include in column (3), (4) ,(7) and 
(8), the variable "Contribution of lower ranks"as well as the interaction variables “Contribution of 
lower ranked × position”. Introducing these variables does not affect the significance of the decline of 
contributions with position. The coefficient associated with the variable “contribution of lower ranked 
individuals”  is  positive  and  significant,  indicating  that  subjects  are  positively  influenced  by  the 
observation of previous contributions in the sequence. However this effect remains constant over the 
sequence as indicated by the non-significance of the interaction variables. Put together, our results 
clearly show that the decrease of contribution levels with the position in the game is not due to a 
decreasing reciprocity effect but rather reflects a decline of the leadership effect. We show in the next 
section that the latter observation is compatible with a model of sequential contributions where early 
players in the sequence take into account their influence on subsequent decision makers by making a 
large contribution. As the decision sequence moves towards the last player, there are less and less 
agents  who  are  likely  to  be  influenced  and  therefore  the  leadership  effect  vanishes  and  as  a 





5. Moral motivation in a sequential contribution environment 
 
The standard game-theoretic model falls short of predicting our experimental results. Recently 
proposed models of behaviour, such as inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 2000), also fail to predict 
the pattern of contributions observed in our sequential treatment with information (see Appendix A). In 
this section, we suggest an alternative model of behaviours, with moral motivation, and show that most 
behavioural patterns observed in our experimental data are compatible  with the predictions of  this 
model.  Our  model  draws  on  Brekke  et  al.  (2003),  in  that  preferences  incorporate  a  concern  for 
individual’s self image as a socially responsible person. This concern is modelled in Brekke et al. 
(2003) as a loss function that penalizes any gap between the individual’s contribution and his so-called 
“morally ideal action”. But our approach  differs in the specification of the morally ideal actions, which 
we allow to be updated according to the observed contribution of others. Before we expose our model, 
a few preliminary remarks are necessary in order to define more precisely the idea  of moral motivation 
and to explain our qualification of this notion.  
 
Fundamentally, a key assumption is that preferences are structured into several layers (Harsanyi, 1955, 
Sen, 1977), some with moral reasoning, the interplay of which finally explains actual decisions. For 
instance, suppose that individuals have two layers of preferences: self-interested preferences and social 
preferences. Upon deciding how much to contribute to a particular public good, any individual has in 
mind a morally ideal level of contribution (Nyborg, 2000, Brekke et al, 2003), which is derived under 
the assumption that he is able to judge matters from society’s point of view, following a combination of 
the  utilitarian  philosophy  and  a  version  of  Kant’s  Categorical  Imperative:  “how  much  should  I 27 
contribute to maximize social welfare, given that everybody else would act like me?” The answer ends 
up in a Paretian level of contribution; and any discrepancy between this morally ideal course of action 
and the actual decision incurs a loss of utility. Finally, an agent’s actual contribution will be the result 
of a trade-off between his marginal utility of improving his self-image by making a large contribution, 
his marginal utility from enjoying more of the public good and his marginal utility of consuming more 
of the private good. In some sense people make intrapersonal comparisons between their utility layers.  
 
Brekke et al (2003)’s approach of moral motivation, however interesting, also raises a few issues. 
Considering what should be the best plan for society, would individuals’ answers be independent of the 
society in which they live? For instance, would they take a Pareto optimal allocation as an ethically 
valuable  goal  regardless  of  the  fact  that  all  other  people  free-ride?  Or  would  they  consider  some 
societies more deserving than others? Answering no would be at odds with many experimental results 
supporting the idea that, for many people, reciprocity in public goods issues matters a lot, e.g. in a 
public good context, “ I free-ride, not because it is my self interest, but because everybody else does”. 
The answers to those questions are sufficiently unclear to call for an important qualification of Brekke 
et al (2003)’s theory of behaviors. 
 
Our originality in this matter is to assume that individuals’ moral responsibility is not only the result of 
some  autonomous  ethical  reflection,  as  would  do  impartial  outside  observers,  but  it  is  also  partly 
determined by their actual social environment. It is therefore affected by the observations of others’ 
actions: an agent who observes other agents’ contributions to the public good, will eventually revise his 
initial morally ideal behavior. Of course, in a more balanced perception of reality, some individuals 
might have a purely intrinsic motivation to contribute and therefore will always stick to it whatever the 
other agents contribute. Our intuition however, is that most individuals are amenable to reconsider their 28 
morally ideal point according to the current social morality partly revealed by other members of their 
group.  We  suggest  that  the  reciprocity  hypothesis,  a  widespread  argument  to  explain  individual 
decisions in public good experiments, could be rooted in the updating of one’s moral motivation. Such 
an updating arises naturally in a context where individual contributions to the public good are made 
sequentially.  
 
Turning  to  formal  matters,  the  cardinal  representation  of  agents’  preferences  with  moral 
motivation is given by: 
 
n 1,...,     i     ), ˆ ( ) ( ) , ( = - - + + - = - - i i i i i i i i
i x x v x x x w x x U b       (4) 
 
where  [ 1 , 0 ] Î b  is the marginal utility from consuming the public good G = xi + x-i. 
The novel aspect of the above preferences comes from the moral motivation embodied in the function 
(.) i v . If  i x ˆ stands for agent i’s moral ideal, then his utility loss for any deviation from his moral ideal is 
) ˆ ( i i i x x v - . There are two important remarks about the function  (.) i v . Firstly, in general the moral 
motivation function is specific to each individual. We shall however assume that all individuals suffer 
the same loss from a deviation from their moral motivation. Secondly, and more importantly, the moral 
ideal  i x ˆ is also specific to each individual even if all agents share the same loss function. In general 
i x ˆ can take any value between 0 and wi . This seems consistent with the experimental findings about 
over-contributions in public goods games. The average contribution in the first round is about half the 
endowment, and there is a large variance in individual contributions. Two natural assumptions about 
the loss function are as follows:  
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Assumption 5.1.  v(0) = 0,  i i i x x x v ˆ  x iff   0 ) ˆ ( i ¹ > - .  
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The first assumption is obvious. The second assumption means that, starting from a situation where 
agent i contributes less (more) than her moral ideal, a marginal increase of xi reduces (increases) her 
loss of utility.  
 
As previously announced, we shall conceptualize the moral ideal of each agent as a function of two 
arguments. The first argument, noted xi*, captures an autonomous ethical logic, that we shall leave 
relatively unspecified for the purpose of this paper. It could be derived from a Kantian Categorical 
Imperative combined with an utilitarian philosophy, as in Brekke et al (2003), and would correspond in 
this  case  to  a  Pareto  optimum  level  of  contribution.  In  the  framework  with  symmetric  agents  we 
consider, all those individual Pareto optimum levels are the same, i.e. xi* = x* = w,  i " . Note that from 
an  experimental  point  of  view  xi*  is  not  observable.  The  second  argument/logic  captures  social 
influences on ethical thoughts via the observation of the average contribution of the previous agents in 
the sequence  1 - i x . The observation of others’ contribution leads agents to revise their own moral ideal. 
We assume that  i x ˆ , called the effective moral ideal from now on, is a convex combination of the 
autonomous moral obligation xi* and the observed average contribution of previous agents: 
 




- - - - = + - = i i i i i i i i i x x x x x x q q q ,   ] 1 , 0 [ Î i q ,  i = 2,3,…,n. 
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The case of the first contributor is sligtly different. Since he has no previous observation to update his 
ethical position, then his effective moral ideal is simply  1 ˆ x  = x1*.  
 
Remember that actions are taken sequentially: agent 1 decides first, followed by agent 2, then agent 3 
and so until agent n. In order to arrive at tractable solutions for the Stackelberg equilibrium, we restrict 
the model to the symmetric case. We do this by introducing two simplifying assumptions. First, we 
shall assume that all players have the same autonomous moral ideal, xi* = x* for all i, with 0 < x* < w. 
Second, we shall also assume that  i   ], 1 , 0 [ " Î =q qi . Note that by our first assumption, we exclude the 
uninteresting  case of no autonomous moral ideal (x*  = 0) - this would mean individuals have no 
personal ethical ideal -  and the case where the autonomous moral ideal corresponds to the Pareto 
optimum contribution (x*= w). Even though the autonomous moral ideal could be arbitrarily close to w, 
this  corner  case  is  eliminated  for  two  reasons.  The  possibility  of  corner  decisions  complicates 
substantially the analysis, because we would need to take into account of a sequence of discontinuous 
best replies functions to be anticipated by each leader.  We discard this possibility to arrive  at the 
phenomenon of interest as simply as possible. Secondly, there is no empirical reason to believe that 
subjects take the Pareto contribution as a reference for their autonomous moral ideal. Rather, the large 
available experimental evidence on voluntary contributions to a public good suggests that on average, 
in the first round, subjects have a moral motivation to contribute something to the public good, but far 
below the Pareto optimum level of contribution.  
 
Under the previous restrictions the interior Stackelberg equilibrium turns out to be:  
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This equilibrium condition can be understood as follows: at equilibrium, agent n-k chooses a level of 
contribution k n x - which equalizes his marginal utility from deviating from his effective moral ideal to 
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h n bq  captures the influence of his marginal contribution on the remaining subsequent players. 
Note that, because the last expression is always positive, early players can contribute more than their 
moral ideal.  
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Notice that g’(k) > 0 for k ³ 1. By construction, g(k) is agent k’s optimal departure from his ideal level 
of contribution. 
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Assumption 5.3 is easy to satisfy; for instance as the marginal utility of the public good tends to zero, 
the right hand side of the inequality growths arbitrarily large. Note that Assumption 5.3 is equivalent to 
assuming that the first contributor (agent 1) contributes less than his moral ideal, 
*
1 x x < . If the latter 
inequality  is  satisfied,  by  Assumption  5.2  we  have  0 ) ( '
*
1 £ - x x v   which  means 


















h n bq b  (or equivalently Assumption 5.3). 
 
Proposition 5.1.  Under Assumption (5.3), successive contributions to the public good are decreasing: 
 
x1 > x2 > … > xk > …> xn . 33 
 
Proof : See Appendix B.1  
 
This first property fits well with the pattern of contributions observed in the lab (and summarized in 
Result 3, Section 4.2). 
 
Without Assumption 5.3, some agents can contribute to the public good above their moral ideal, as 
illustrated by the following example. Assume the moral obligation function is 
2 ) (
2




and let the parameters take the following values :  
 
n = 0.1, w = 40 , x* = 20, b = q = 0.9 and n = 3 
 
Computing the Stackelberg equilibrium, one finds:  
 
x1 = 31.15 , x2 = 33.08 , x3 =  29.90. 
 
This  example  illustrates  the  property  that  although  early  contributions  may  increase,  they  will 
eventually decrease at some point in the sequence. Actually, without Assumption 5.3 we have the 
following: 
 
Proposition 5.2. There exists an agent j £ n such that, starting from that agent successive contributions 
to the public good are decreasing: 
xj > xj+1 > …> xn . 34 
 
Proof :  See Appendix B.2 
 
Another interesting property obtains when the parameter t has a positive impact on the first agent’s 
optimal departure from his ideal contribution, hence on a positive effect on the ideal point of the second 
agent. Formally: 
Assumption 5.4.   [ ] 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > -
¶
¶
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Proposition 5.3. Under Assumption 5.4, the higher the importance of observed behaviours on agents’ 
moral obligation (higher q), the higher the contributions at a Stackelberg equilibrium. 
 
Proof : See Appendix B.3 
 
According to proposition 5.3 any average  h x is an increasing function of q. When q  tends to zero, the 
Stackelberg  equilibrium  converges  to  the  Nash  equilibrium  of  a  public  good  game  with  morally 
motivated  contributors.  Proposition  5.3  implies  therefore  that  Nash  contributions  are  lower  than 
Stackelberg contributions, which is in accordance with our experimental findings (see Result 1, Section 
4.1). Also, this particular case of moral motivation function boils down to Brekke et al (2003). With 
their model of preferences, the Nash and the Stackelberg equilbrium of the game with payoffs given by 
(4) are identical. Moral motivation per se is not sufficient to explain the regularities observed in the lab, 
except  the  tendency  for  agents  to  over-contribute,  which  is  not  predicted  by  standard  Nash 
contributions without moral motivation. 
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Proposition 5.4 :  n x  is increasing with n.  
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[ ] ) ( ), 1 ( ),..., 2 ( ), 1 ( ) ( ˆ * k n g k n g n g n g L x k n g x x k k k - - - - - + = - + = ,  i.e.  contribution  of  player  k  is  a  linear 
combination of  ) ( ), 1 ( ),..., 2 ( ), 1 ( k n g k n g n g n g - - - - - with positive coefficients, increasing n will increase 
xk. 
Proposition 5.4 is intuitive: the larger the number of followers who can be induced to contribute, 
the stronger the marginal incentive for any leader to increase his own contribution. An equivalent 
interpretation is as follows:  when more followers are to be influenced, increasing the level of public 
good by one unit can be done (indirectly) at a lower cost. Yet this “length” effect is not confirmed by 
our experimental results. One possible explanation might be the increased complexity of calculus when 
there are more agents. Or the other hand the intrinsic moral motivation might depend negatively on the 
number of agents in the population, so that the leadership effect might be counter-balanced by an 
increased perception of the free-riding problem. While our model fails to predict the  neutral size effect 
found in our data, it is not sufficient to be rejected, since a positive experimental size effect might be 
found for larger population increases. Furthermore, our model nicely predicts the vanishing leadership 
effect found in our data and provides a nice explanation for declining contributions as the influence 
declines. Finally, our model explains our major finding, the fact that the average contribution is larger 




We studied an experimental game of voluntary contributions to a public good, in which players 
move sequentially. In our test treatment later players can observe the contributions of previous players, 36 
while  in  our  control  treatments,  all  players  have  to  make  their  contribution  without  knowing  the 
contributions of the other players. Our results show that sequentiality without observability does not 
significantly  affect  the  average  level  of  contribution,  compared  to  the  simultaneous  contribution 
treatment. Our result contrast therefore with the literature on the positional order effect (Rapoport et al., 
1993,  Budescu  et  al.,  1995,  Suleiman  et  al.,  1996,  Rapoport,  1997).  However,  our  voluntary 
contribution game has a unique equilibrium, avoiding therefore the type of coordination problem that 
arises in step-level public goods games or in common pool resources games, which are the type of 
games used to exhibit the positional order effect. Furthermore, our result is in accordance with Güth et 
al. (1998), who showed that in a game with a unique equilibrium, the positional order effect is seriously 
weakened.  
 
Two major results have been obtained : i) the average level of contribution is significantly increased, 
when subjects contribute sequentially and have the opportunity to observe previous contributions, and 
ii) the average contribution declines with the position in the sequential contribution  game because 
fewer subjects are likely to be influenced as the game proceeds and therefore the leadership effect 
vanishes over the sequence.  
To explain those results, we have imagined a model of moral motivation with an updating process for 
the  morally  ideal  behavior.  Furthermore,  as  in  our  model,  the  experimental  results  suggest  that 
contributions are not purely intrinsically motivated but are conditioned on observed contributions, in 
line with earlier findings on conditional cooperation in social dilemma games (Keser & van Winden, 
2000). Our model of updating moral motivation provides a rational for conditional cooperation, based 
on mixing intrinsic motivation together with reciprocal behaviour. The model is also compatible with 
the so-called leadership effect, highlighted in several experiments on public goods provisions. Subjects 
who decide earlier in the sequence know that their contribution will affect positively the morally ideal 37 
contributions of later decision makers; accordingly they will try to encourage them by making a large 
contribution. As the decision sequence moves toward the last player, implying that fewer players are 
likely to be influenced, the leadership effect vanishes, and the average contribution declines in the 
higher ranks of the game. This outcome is both observed in our data and predicted by our model.  We 
also find that in the sequential treatment with observability, the level of contribution is not conditioned 
on the previous period average contribution as in the simultaneous treatment, but on contributions of 
earlier players in the sequence observed within the period. Finally, in contrast to the predictions of our 
model, we do not find that the size of the group has a significant impact on contributions. 
 
While our model nicely explains the observed pattern of decreasing contributions by rank, it’s main 
limitation is that it describes our results only on average. Nevertheless the model could be extended to a 
repeated  game  of  sequential  contributions,  in  order  to  explain  the  declining  per  period  average 
contribution. This would require a more general rule for revising a player’s moral motivation, by taking 
into account both the within period observed contributions and past contributions of previous periods. 
The model should explain why the average contribution declines both in the simultaneous and the 
sequential treatments (with or without information). There are some indications in our data why such a 
model would be promising.  First, our analysis shows that there is an independent component in a 
subject’s contribution, since past own contribution has a significant effect on the current contribution 
for all treatments. Second, our data clearly reveals that subjects choose their current contribution by 
taking  into  account  the  most  recent  information  about  previous  contributions.  In  the  simultaneous 
treatment and the sequential treatment without information, they rely on the average contribution of 
previous  periods,  while  in  the  sequential  treatment  with  information  they  tend  to  ignore  this 
information and focus on the contributions of lower ranked players within the period. Finally, we also 38 
showed that the first player in the sequence takes into account the average contribution of the previous 
period.   
 
The fact that later contributors are influenced by the observed contributions of early players, can have 
important policy implications. Posting information on previous contributions might therefore be an 
efficient tool for increasing the level of contributions, suggesting that the design of public policies 
should take into account the leadership effect. For example, public announcements of previous efforts 
to reduce emissions might increase society’s overall abatement effort. Clearly, the leadership effect 
alone is not sufficient to solve the social dilemma arising in voluntary contribution games. Fehr & 
Gächter (2000) showed that the introduction of costly punishment opportunities provides strong enough 
incentives to overcome the dilemma. Our results suggest that the same outcome can be reached with 
less demanding punishment opportunities. Introducing asymmetric punishment opportunities, i.e. early 
players  can  only  punish  later  players,  might  provide  enough  incentives  to  increase  the  level  of 
















We show, in the case of two players, that inequity aversion fails to predict the pattern of decreasing 
successive contributions observed in the lab.  
 
Let yj and yi  designate Player j and i’s monetary payoff respectively. Player i’s utility with inequity 
aversion à la Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is given by: 
 
ui = yi – a max(yj – yi, 0) – b max(yi – yj, 0) 
 
with a > b ≥ 0  , b < 1  and yi = w – xi + b(xi + xj),  b < 1. Therefore :  
 
ui = yi – a max(xi – xj, 0) – b max(xj – xi, 0). 
 
Let Player j be the first contributor and Player i the second contributor. We start with player i’s best-
reply. Note first that xi > xj is impossible, since we would have  
 
ui = yi – a(xj – xi) =  w – xi( 1 - b + a) + xj(b + a) 
 
which is maximized for xi = 0 since 1 - b + a > 0. Therefore it remains to analyze the case xj  ≥ xi.  
Assuming xj  ≥ xi,   
 
ui = w – xi( 1 - b - b) + xj(b - b). 
 
If :  
 
i)  1 < b + b, Player i maximises his utility by contributing xi* = w 
ii)  1 > b + b, Player i maximises his utility by contributing xi* = 0 
 
 
Assuming b = 0.5, as in the experiment, case i requires  b ≥ 0.5, i.e. an altruistic Player i. In the 
more likely case where b < 0.5, the model predicts xi* = 0. 
 
Assuming xi* = 0, player j’s utility becomes uj = w -  xj ( 1 - b - b ),  with 1 - b - b > 0, and 
therefore xj* = 0. 
Assuming xi* = w, player j’s utility becomes uj = w -  xj ( 1 - b - b ) + w (b - b),  with 1 - b - b < 0, 
and therefore xj* = w.. 
 
 








1.Proof of Proposition 5.1 
 
Under Assumption 5.3, one has 
( ) . 1 , 0 1
1
1 ³ " £ - + + - ∑
=
- k h n
k
h
bq b  
 
As  a  result  ( ) ( ) ( ) , 0 1 '
1
1




h h n v k g bq b   due  to  the  properties  of  function  v(.)  explicited  in 
Assumption 5.2. 
 
The proof will be established recursively. 
 
Note first that  * ) 1 ( * 1 x n g x x £ - + =  because  0 ) 1 ( £ - n g . Then observe that  1 2 2 ) 2 ( ˆ x n g x x £ - + =  because on 
one hand  * 2 ˆ x x £ , as a convex combination of x* and  * 1 ˆ x x £ , and on the other hand  0 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( £ - £ - n g n g  
since g(.) is an increasing function. 
 
Now assume that the property  1 - £ h h x x  holds for h = 3,…,k, for some k. To complete the proof, it must 
be established that  k k x x £ +1 . If, as assumed, the property is true until h = k, then the sequence of 
averages  h x  decreases with h until h = k. It follows that  1 ˆ + k x , a convex combination of x* and  k x , is 
lower than  k x ˆ , a convex combination of x* and  k k x x > -1 . To conclude, 
 
( ) ( ), ˆ 1 ˆ 1 1 k n g x x k n g x x k k k k - + = < - - + = + +  
 




2. Proof of Proposition 5.2 
 
Without Assumption 5.3, the sign of 
( ) . 1 , 1
1
1 ³ " - + + - ∑
=
- k h n
k
h
bq b  
is ambiguous. Therefore g(n-k) could be positive. However, as k increases it finally becomes negative, 
sing g(.) is a monotonic function and g(0) = v’
-1(-1+b). This means there is an agent j £ n such that g(n-
k) £ 0, for all k ³ j. 
 
Starting with this agent j, there are two cases to be considered. 
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The first case is where  the previous average is  above the  moral obligation,  * 1 x xk > - , k  ³ j. Then 
( ) 1 ˆ - < - + = k k k x k n g x x , because on one hand  1 ˆ - £ k k x x , as a convex combination of x* and  * 1 x xk > - , and 
on the other hand  ( ) 0 £ -k n g . To complete the proof, it is sufficient to observe that: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] k k k x x k
k
x x + - + - = - + 1 1 1 1 * 1 ˆ q q  
 




x x 1 1 * 1 1 1 q q q q + - + - = - -  
 
[ ] k k k k x x x
k
x ˆ 1 ˆ 1 < - + = - q  since  k k x x > -1 , 
as established above. As soon as the average contribution declines, one can reproduce the recursive 
demonstration of the previous proposition to show that subsequent contributions are lower. 
 
The second case, where  * 1 x xk < - , follows a similar logic. First,  ( ) 1 ˆ - < - + = k k k x k n g x x , because on one 
hand  * ˆ x xk£ , as a convex combination of x* and  * 1 x xk < - , and on the other hand  ( ) 0 £ -k n g . Again the 
average contribution declines, so that the previous reasoning applies to complete the proof. QED. 
 
3. Proof of Proposition 5.3 
 
Here also, the proof is established recursively. It is readily checked that x1 is an increasing function of 
q . Under Assumption 5.4 this is also the case for x2. Assume this property hold for xh , h = 3,…,k and 
let us show it holds also for xk+1.  
 
Because  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , , ,..., 2 , 1 * h k n g n g n g L x x h h " - - - + =  
it must be true that each function Lh , h£ k, is an increasing function of q . 
Then, by construction 
( ) ( ) 1 * 1 1 - - + + - = + k n g x x x k k q q , 
 
( ) [ ] ( ) 1 * 1 * 1





h q q , 
 
( ) 1 1 *





h q . 
Observing the last line, the result simply follows from the property that each function Lh (.), h£ k, is an 
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Sequential with  information Sequential without information
Simultaneous 48 
Table 1: Number of independent observations per cell  
Session 
number 




Size of the 
group 
1  Simultaneous game   5  20  4 
2   Simultaneous game #  4  16  4 
3  Simultaneous game #  4  16  4 
4  Simultaneous game   2  16  8 
5  Simultaneous game   2  16  8 
6  Simultaneous game   2  16  8 
         7  Sequential game with info  3  12  4 
8  Sequential game with info  3  12  4 
9  Sequential game with info  2  16  8 
10  Sequential game with info  2  16  8 
11  Sequential game with info  2  16  8 
12  Sequential game without info  4  16  4 
13  Sequential game without info  4  16  4 
14  Sequential game without info  2  16  8 
15  Sequential game without info  2  16  8 
16  Sequential game without info  2  16  8 
        # simultaneous game with framing  49 
Table 2. Group Average Contribution Levels 
 
Group                                   N=4  N=8 










































































































































# The results show no significant difference at any level of significance in average contribution between the simultaneous  





Table 3: Random-effects GLS regression of Individual Contribution: Information and Order Effects 
 
  Sequ. treat.  (sequ with and 
without info) 
Treat without info. (simult and 
seq without info) 
Simult treat and seq.  treat with 
info 


































(0.199)         
Sequentiality      -0.144  -0.175     
      (0.171)  (0.175)     
Seq*Information          0.454**  0.584*** 
          (0.190)  (0.191) 
Period 15  -1.728***  -0.055  -0.841***  -0.526*  -0.981***  -1.014*** 
  (0.462)  (0.342)  (0.326)  (0.328)  (0.331)  (0.369) 
Constant  2.028***  1.887***  1.227***  1.532***  1.701***  2.017*** 
  (0.295)  (0.238)  (0.209)  (0.288)  (0.218)  (0.279) 
Observations  784  1344  1176  1344  1064  1344 
R squared  0.15  0.14  0.25  0.17  0.24  0.14 
 
Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 51 
 
     
Table 4: Determinants of contribution (Random-effects GLS regression)   
 
  Simult treat.  Seq treat. without 
info 
Seq. Treat. with info 
All positions 
Seq. Treat. with info 
Final position 
Variable  N=4  N=8  N=4  N=8  N=4  N=8  N=4  N=8 





































First position in the 
group 








   
Contribution of 
lower ranked indiv. 








-0.531  -1.509***  -1.419**  0.423  -1.802**  -0.454  -1.985  -0.579  Period 15 
(0.352)  (0.502)  (0.624)  (0.421)  (0.752)  (0.555)  (1.452)  (1.08) 
Constant  0.972***  1.518***  1.306***  1.461***  6.137***  1.981***  1.806*     0.683 
  (0.231)  (0.368)  (0.396)  (0.350)  (0.969)  (0.457)  (1.119)  (1.224)) 
Observations  728  672  448  672  252  588  84  84 
R2  0.36  0.19  0.18  0.12  0.26  0.14  0.08  0.06 






.  Table 5. Group Average Contribution by position in the game (N = 4) 
 
Group                   Sequential treatment with  info 
 
Sequential treatment without info 
    All positions  First position    Last 
position 
All positions  First position  Last position 
1  4.58 
(3.67) 










2  6.23 
(3.11) 
7.33   
(1.87) 








3  5.15 
(2.99) 
6.86      
(2.16) 








4  5.53 
(3.31) 
6.33    
 (2.60) 























6.93     
(2.93) 
 
4.4     
(2.13) 
2.86     
(2.58) 
 






































































Sequential treatment with  info 
 
Sequential treatment without info 
  All positions  First position  Last position  All position  First position  Last position 
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 Table 7: Random-effects GLS regression of contribution by position in the game 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     







  N=4  N=8 
  Seq. 
without 
Information 
Sequential with Information  Sequential 
without 
Information 
Sequential with Information 
  (1)  (3)  (2)  (4)  (5)  (7)  (6)  (8) 
0.305***  0.193***  0.195***  0.199***  0.354***  0.300***  0.264***  0.263***  i's contribution 
(lagged)  (0.045)  (0.050)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.039)  (0.039) 
Position 3  -0.358  -1.362***  -1.243***  -2.045*  -0.228  -0.912**  -0.566  -1.509 
  (0.397)  (0.394)  (0.458)  (1.171)  (0.368)  (0.446)  (0.511)  (1.098) 
Position 4  -0.193  -3.076***  -2.632***  -1.920*  -0.210  -0.518  -0.078  1.124 
  (0.397)  (0.394)  (0.466)  (1.045)  (0.368)  (0.445)  (0.512)  (1.022) 
Position 5          -0.050  -1.471***  -1.076**  -1.204 
          (0.368)  (0.446)  (0.512)  (1.044) 
Position 6          -0.434  -1.851***  -1.312**  -0.620 
          (0.368)  (0.445)  (0.514)  (0.996) 
Position 7          0.298  -3.363***  -2.694***  -2.014** 
          (0.368)  (0.448)  (0.519)  (0.972) 
Position 8          -0.317  -3.282***  -2.452***  -2.158** 
          (0.368)  (0.446)  (0.526)  (0.912) 
Cbt. of lower ranked      0.273***  0.293**      0.174***  0.224** 
      (0.065)  (0.125)      (0.040)  (0.105) 
Interaction variables                 
      0.128        0.155  Cbt. of lower ranked 
indivX Pos. 3        (0.169)        (0.155) 
      -0.135        -0.209  Cbt. of lower ranked 
indiv.X Pos. 4        (0.157)        (0.147) 
              0.027  Cbt. of lower ranked 
indiv.X Pos. 5                (0.148) 
              -0.125  Cbt. of lower ranked 
indiv.X Pos. 6                (0.149) 
              -0.130  Cbt. of lower ranked 
indiv.X Pos. 7                (0.149) 
              -0.041  Cbt. of lower ranked 
indiv.X Pos. 8                (0.146) 
period15  -2.074***  -2.104***  -1.895**  -1.839**  0.254  -0.583  -0.536  -0.534 
  (0.636)  (0.626)  (0.738)  (0.737)  (0.414)  (0.501)  (0.534)  (0.535) 
Constant  3.057***  5.476***  3.628***  3.475***  2.216***  4.938***  3.706***  3.385*** 
  (0.310)  (0.355)  (0.595)  (0.913)  (0.250)  (0.311)  (0.481)  (0.781) 
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